Abstract
Introduction

29
Confidence refers to the "sense of knowing" that comes with a decision. Confidence 30 affects the planning of subsequent actions after a decision 1, 2 , learning 3 , and cooperation in 31 group decision making 4 . Failures in utilizing confidence information have been linked to 32 psychiatric disorders 5 . 33
While human observers can report their self-assessment of the quality of their decisions 6, 7, 34 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 , the computations underlying confidence reports are still insufficiently understood. 35
The leading theory of confidence suggested that confidence reflects the probability that a 36 decision is correct 7, 8, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 . We refer to this idea as the "Bayesian confidence 37
hypothesis" meaning that the decision-maker uses the posterior probability of the chosen 38 category (i.e. the probability that decision is correct) for their confidence reports. In 39 neurophysiological studies, a brain region or a neural process is considered to represent 40 confidence if its responses correlate with the probability that a decision is correct 18, 19, 20 . 41
Behavioral studies testing whether human confidence reports follow Bayesian confidence 42 hypothesis have shown mixed results: While some studies found resemblances between 43
Bayesian confidence and empirical data e.g. 18, 19, 21, 22 , others have suggested that confidence 44 reports deviate from the Bayesian confidence hypothesis e.g. 23, 24, 25 . 45
Even though the Bayesian confidence hypothesis is the leading theory of confidence, there 46 is currently no evidence to rule out the possibility that confidence is affected by unchosen 47 options. Specifically, people could be less confident if the next-best option is very close to the 48 best option. In other words, confidence could depend on the difference between the posterior 49 probabilities of the best and the next-best options, rather than on the absolute value of the 50 posterior of the best option. This idea has not been tested because previous studies of decision 51 confidence have predominantly used two-alternative decision tasks; in such tasks, the 52 alternative hypothesis is equivalent to the Bayesian confidence hypothesis, because the 53 difference between the two posterior probabilities in a two-alternative task is a monotonic 54 function of the highest posterior probability. Thus, to dissociate these two models of 55 confidence, we need more than two alternatives. Therefore, we use a three-alternative 56 decision task. To preview our main result, we find that the difference-based model accountswell for the data, whereas the model corresponding to the Bayesian confidence hypothesis and 58 a third, entropy-based model do not. 59
60
Results
61
To investigate the computations underlying confidence reports in the presence of multiple 62 alternatives, we designed a three-alternative categorization task. On each trial, participants 63 viewed a large number of exemplar dots from each of the three categories (color-coded), 64 along with one target dot in a different color ( Figure 1A) . Each category corresponded to an 65 uncorrelated, circularly symmetric Gaussian distribution in the plane. We asked participants 66 to regard the stimulus as a bird's eye view of three groups of people. People within a group 67 wear shirts of the same color, and the target dot represents a person from one of the three 68 
Experiment 1 146
In Experiment 1, the centers of the three category distributions were aligned vertically 147 ( Figure 1B ). There were four conditions: In the first two conditions, the centers were evenly 148 spaced horizontally. In the last two conditions, the center of the central distribution was closer 149 to the center of either the left or the right distribution. The vertical position of the target dot 150 was sampled from a normal distribution, and the horizontal position of the target dot was 151 sampled uniformly between the center of the leftmost and right-most classes plus an extension 152
to the left and the right (see Methods). 153
We plotted the psychometric curves (mean confidence rating as a function of the 154 horizontal position of the target dot) by averaging confidence reports across trials using a 155 sliding window (Figure 3) . Mean confidence rating varied as a function of the horizontal 156 position of the target. In the first two conditions (Figure 3) , where the three distributions were 157 evenly spaced, the psychometric curves showed two dips, with the lowest confidence attained 158 at two positions symmetric around 0°. 159
We simulated the predicted psychometric curves using the best-fitting parameters of each 160 model ( Figure 3B ). The fits of the Max and the Difference models resembled the data, but the 161 best fit of the Entropy model showed a dip at the center in the first condition. 162
In the third and fourth conditions, in which the three distributions were unevenly spaced, 163 mean confidence was lowest around the centers of the two distributions that were closest to 164 each other. Only the Difference model exhibited this pattern, while the Max and the Entropy 165 models deviated more clearly from the data. 166
The models not only make predictions for confidence ratings, but also for the category 167 decisions (Supplementary Figure 2) . Participants categorized the target dot based on its 168 location, and when the target dot was close to the boundary between two categories (the 169 location where two categories have equal likelihood), they assigned the target to those two 170 categories with nearly equal probabilities. In general, this pattern is consistent with an 171 observer who chooses the category associated with the highest posterior probability. TheEntropy model fits worst, even though all three models used the same rule for the category 173 decision; this is because the confidence data also need to be accounted for. 174
Using the Akaike Information Criterion for model comparison ( Figure 4A and 175 Figure 5) . 186
Supplementary
187
Experiment 2 188
In Experiment 2, we aimed to test whether the findings in Experiment 1 could be 189 generalized to other stimulus configurations, where the centers of the categories varied in a 190 two-dimensional space. We tested four conditions in which the centers of the three groups 191 varied along both horizontal and vertical axis ( Figure 1C) . We sampled the target dot 192 positions uniformly within a circular area centered on the screen. In addition, the distribution 193 of the categories used in Experiment 2 allowed us to probe confidence reports in a wider 194 range of posterior distributions (Supplementary Figure 1B) . For example, we can probe the 195 confidence report when the target dot had the same distance to all three categories in 196 Experiment 2, but not in Experiment 1. 197
The "psychometric curve" now is a heat map in two dimensions ( Table 1) . 211
212
Experiment 3 213
So far, we found that the Difference model fits the data better than the Max and the 214 Entropy. However, whether participants report the probability that a decision is correct (the 215 Max model) might depend on the experimental design. In Experiment 1 and 2, participants 216 received no feedback on their category decision. Thus, the probability of being correct in the 217 task could be difficult to learn. To investigate this issue, in Experiment 3, using the same four 218 stimulus configurations as those in Experiment 1 (Figure 1B confidence reports and predictions of Bayesian models e.g. 18, 19, 21, 22 , the Bayesian 263 confidence hypothesis has been questioned before 8, 13, 14, 15, 16 . In addition to the probability of 24, 25 . However, in one study 24 , the experimental design did not allow 268 the authors to strongly distinguish the model that was based on Bayesian confidence 269 hypothesis from those that were not. Moreover, in both studies 24, 25 , the alternative models 270
were based on heuristic decision rules without a broader theoretical interpretation. Here, we 271 have identified a type of deviation from the Bayesian predictions that is not only of a 272 qualitatively different nature, but that also raises new theoretical questions. 273
Specifically, the Difference model is currently a descriptive model. We have two 274 suggestions to interpret it as an outcome of approximate inference. First, the Difference model 275 might be an approximation to a model in which confidence depends on the probability that an 276 observer made the best possible decision. Specifically, the observer is "aware" that their 277 decision is based on the noisy posterior p noisy rather than the true posterior p. Thus, it is 278 possible that the chosen category is not the category with the highest probability in the true 279 posterior. Confidence would be derived from the probability that the chosen category has the 280 highest probability in the true posterior distribution. The observer achieves this computation 281 using the evidence for the next-best option: The stronger the evidence for the next-best option, 282 the more likely that the chosen category is not the top choice in the true posterior, thus leading 283 to lower confidence. Recent work has shown that subjective confidence guides information 284 seeking during decision-making 40 . Under the Difference model, during information seeking, 285 the observer's goal is to make sure that the best option is better than the alternative options. 286
Low confidence would encourage the observer to collect more information in order to 287 strengthen the belief that the best option is better than the next-best option. 288
Second, the finding that confidence is best described by the relative strength of the 289 evidence of the top two options might be related to other findings in multiple-alternative 290 decision-making. For example, in one experiment, observers watched columns of bricks build 291 up on the screen, and reported which column had the highest accumulation rate 41 . A heuristic 292 model in which the observer makes a decision when the height of the tallest column exceeds 293 the height of the next-tallest column by a fixed threshold captured the overall pattern of 294 people's behavior. In a study on self-directed learning in a three-alternative categorizationtask, observers had to learn the category distributions by sampling from the feature space and 296 receiving feedback. Instead of choosing the most informative samples, human observers chose 297 ones for which the likelihood of two categories were similar, namely those located at 298 boundaries between pairs of two categories 42 . This literature allows us to speculate that 299 observers might decompose a multiple-alternative decision into several simpler (perhaps 300 binary) choices. This notion is reminiscent of the concept in prospect theory that before a 301 phase of evaluation, extremely unlikely outcomes might be first discarded in an "editing" 302 phase 43 . Hence, an alternative interpretation of our results is that confidence reports deviate 303 from the Bayesian confidence hypothesis (the Max model) because the observer estimates the 304 probability of correct in a way that ignores the options that are discarded before final 305 evaluation. In the Difference model, the least favorite option is not completely discarded 306 because it decreases the posterior probabilities of the other two options (and thus their 307 difference) by contributing to the normalization pool 44, 45 . Therefore, we consider an extreme 308 version of editing, the Ratio model, in which the least-favorite option does not even 309 participate in normalization, and thus confidence solely depends on the likelihood ratio 310 between the top two options. The Difference model and the Ratio model are not 311 distinguishable in Experiment 1 and 2 (Supplementary Figure 7) . In Experiment 3, the 312
Difference model was very similar to the Ratio model in group-averaged AIC (3.8 ± 1.4 in 313 favor of the Difference model). Testing variable numbers of categories within an experiment 314 might help to differentiate between these two models. 315
We found that compared to the sensory noise, the noise associated with the computation 316 of posterior probability plays a more important role in our task. This is consistent with the 317 findings of a recent study 26 . The relative unimportance of sensory noise could be partly due to 318 our experimental designs, which used stimuli with strong signal strength (saturated color and 319 unlimited duration). Different from our study, devised an evidence 320 accumulation task and further distinguished two types of decision noises: First, the inference 321 noise that was added (and thus increased) with each new stimulus sample. Second, the 322 selection noise that was injected only once at the final response. Because our experiment only 323 had one stimulus in each trial, these two sources of variability were indistinguishable. 324
Do our results generalize beyond perceptual decision-making? In a two-alternative value-325 based decision task, observers reported confidence in a way that was similar to that inperceptual decision tasks 10 : When observers were asked to choose the good with the higher 327 value, confidence increased with the posterior probability that a decision is correct, which in 328 turn increased with the difference in value between the two goods. In addition, choice 329 accuracy was higher in high-confidence trials then in low-confidence trials, reflecting 330 observers' ability to evaluate their own performance. It is unknown how observers compute 331 confidence when there are more than two goods. In three-alternative value-based tasks, the 332 Difference model would predict that, confidence is determined by the difference between the 333 probability that the chosen item is the most valuable and the probability that the next-best 334 item is the most valuable. 335
How does the present study advance our understanding of the neural basis of confidence? 336
Most neurophysiological studies of confidence have considered the neural activity that 337 correlates with the probability of being correct as the neural representation of confidence (but 338 utilizing multiple-alternative tasks, neural studies could dissociate the neural correlates of 343 probability correct from that of the "difference" confidence variable in the Difference model, 344 which according to our results might be the basis of human subjective confidence. A 345 potentially important difference between human and non-human animal studies is that in the 346 latter, confidence is not explicitly reported but operationalized through some aspect of 347 behavior, such as the probability of choosing a "safe" (opt-out) option 19, 20, 46, 47, 48 , or the time 348 spent on waiting for reward 18 . Thus, one should be careful when directly comparing these 349 implicit reports with explicit confidence reports in human studies. were equidistant from the gray point (a*=0, and b*=0). 374
In Experiment 1 and 3, the centers of the three categories were aligned vertically to the 375 center of the screen, and were located at different horizontal positions ( Figure 1B) . In four 376 configurations, the horizontal positions of the centers of the three categories were (-3°, 0°, 3°), 377 (-4°, 0°, 4°), (-3°, -2°, 3°), and (-3°, 2°, 3°), from the center of the screen respectively. In 378 Experiment 2, the centers of the three categories varied on a 2-dimensional space (Figure  379   1C) . In four configurations, the horizontal positions of the centers of the three categories were 380 (-2°, 0°, 2°), (-1.59°, 0°, 1.59°), (-2°, -2°, 2°), and (-2°, 2°, 2°), from the center of the screen, 381
respectively. The vertical positions of the centers were (1.16°, -2.31°, 1.16°), (0.94°, -1.84°, 382 0.94°), (1.16°, 0°, 1.16°), (1.16°, 0°, 1.16°) from the center of the screen respectively. 383 384
Procedures
We told participants that the three groups of exemplar dots represented a bird's eye view 386 of three groups of people. The three groups contained equal numbers of people. The black dot 387 (the target) is a person from one of the three groups, but we do not know the color of her/his 388 T-shirt. We asked participants to categorize the target to one of the three groups based on the 389 (position) information conveyed by the dots, and report their confidence on a four-point 390 Likert scale. 391
Each trial started with the onset of the stimulus and three rectangular buttons positioned at 392 the bottom of the screen ( Figure 1A) . On each trial, participants first categorized the target to 393 one of the three groups (based on the position information conveyed by the dots) by using the 394 mouse to click on one of the three buttons. After participants reported their decision, the three 395 buttons were replaced by four buttons (labeled as "very unconfident", "somewhat 396 unconfident", "somewhat confident", and "very confident") for participants to report their 397 confidence on the decision they made. The stimuli were presented throughout each trial. 398
Reaction time (for both decision and confidence reports) was unlimited. After participants 399
reported their confidence, all the exemplar dots and the rectangular buttons disappeared from 400 the screen, and the next trial started after a 600 ms inter-trial-interval. and I is the 2-dimensional identity matrix. We assume that the observer make a noisy sensory 422 measurement x of the target position. We model the sensory noisy using a Gaussian 423 distribution centered at s with covariance matrix σ 2 I. Thus, the distribution of x given 424 category C is p(x|C) = N(x; m C , (σ s 2 +σ 2 )I). 425
Inference on a given trial. We assume that the observer knows the mean and standard 426 deviation of each category based on the exemplar dots, and that the observer assumes that the 427 three categories have equal probabilities. The posterior probability of category C given the 428 measurement x is then p(C|x) ∝ p(x|C) = N(x; m C , (σ s 2 +σ 2 )I). Instead of the true posterior 429 p(C|x), the observer makes the decisions based on p noisy (C|x), a noisy version of the posterior 430 probability. We obtain a noisy posterior p noisy (C|x) by drawing from a Dirichlet distribution. 431
The Dirichlet distribution is a generalization of the beta distribution. Just like the beta 432 distribution is a continuous distribution over the probability parameter of a Bernoulli random 433 variable, the Dirichlet distribution is a distribution over a vector that represents the 434 probabilities of any number of categories. The Dirichlet distribution is parameterized as 435
p is a vector consists of the three posterior probabilities, p=(p(C=1|x), p(C=2|x), 437 p(C=3|x)). p noisy is a vector consists of the three posterior probabilities perturbed by the 438 decision noise, p noisy =(p noisy (C=1|x), p noisy (C=2|x), p noisy (C=3|x)). The mean of p noisy (C|x) is 439 p(C|x). The concentration parameter α inversely determines the magnitude of the decisionnoise. To make a category decision, the observer chooses the category that maximizes the 441 posterior probability:
442
We considered three models of confidence reports. We first specify in each model an 443 internal continuous confidence variable c*. In the Max (maximum a posteriori) model, c* is 444 the posterior probability of the chosen category: c
) . In the Difference 445 model, c* is a difference: c
is the category 446 with the second-highest posterior probability. In the Entropy model, c* is the negative entropy 447 of the posterior distribution: c* =
In each model, the continuous confidence variable c* is converted to a four-point 449 confidence report c by imposing three confidence criteria b 1 , b 2 and b 3 . For example, c=3 450 when b 2 <c*<b 3 . We also included a lapse rate λ in each model; on a lapse trial, the observer 451 presses a random button for both the decision and the confidence report. In addition to the 452 models that included both sensory and decision noise, we took a factorial approach and tested 453 various combinations of confidence model and sources of variability 52, 53, 54 . For each 454 confidence model, we tested two reduced models by removing either the sensory noise (by 455 setting σ=0) or the decision noise (by setting p noisy (C|x) = p(C|x)) from the model. 456
Response probabilities. So far, we have described the mapping from a measurement x to a 457 decision Ĉ and a confidence report c. The measurement, however, is internal to the observer 458 and unknown to the experimenter. Therefore, to obtain model predictions for a given 459 parameter combination (σ, α, b 1 , b 2 , b 3 , λ) , we perform a Monte Carlo simulation. For every 460 true target position s that occurs in the experiment, we simulated a large number (10,000) of 461 measurements x. For each of these measurements, we compute the posterior p(C|x), add 462 decision noise to obtain p noisy (C|x), and finally obtain a category decision Ĉ and a confidence 463 report c. Across all simulated measurements, we obtain a joint distribution 464 pĈ,c s;σ ,α ,b 1 ,b 2 ,b 3 ,λ ( ) that represents the response probabilities of the observer.
465
Model fitting and model comparison. We denote the parameters (σ, α, b 1 , b 2 , b 3 , λ) 466 collectively by θ. We fit each model to individual-subject data by maximizing the loglikelihood of θ, log L(θ)=log p(data|θ). We assume that the trials are conditionally 468 independent. We denote the target position, category response, and four-point confidence 469 report on the ith trial by s i , Ĉ i , and c i , respectively. Then, the log likelihood becomes 470 Figure 4 and Supplementary Figure 5) . In one version, we 483 kept the sensory noise (σ) in the model while removing the decision noise (α). In the other 484 version we kept the decision noise (α) in the model while removing the sensory noise (σ). 485
486
Model Recovery 487
To evaluate our ability to distinguish the three models, we performed a model recovery 488 analysis. Based on the design of Experiment 1, we synthesized 10 datasets for each of the 489 confidence models. To ensure that the synthesized data resemble our experimental data, we 490 synthesized the data using the group-averaged best-fitting parameter values obtained in 491 Experiment 1. We then fit each of the 30 datasets (3 generating models with 10 datasets each) 492
with the 3 models. Supplementary Figure 3 illustrates the results averaged over 10 datasets for 493 each of the generating model. 494
For Experiment 1 and 3, we used a sliding window to visualize the psychometric curves, 497 defined as the confidence ratings as a function of horizontal location of the target dot. The 498 sliding window had a width of 0.6°. We moved the window horizontally (in a step of 0.1°) 499 from the left to the right of the screen center. At each step, we computed mean confidence 500 rating by averaging the confidence reports c of all the trials fell within the window (based on 501 the horizontal target location of each trial). We first applied this procedure to individual data, 502
and then averaged the individual psychometric curves across subjects (the black curves in 503 Figure 3B and Supplementary Figure 6B) . For Experiment 1, we visualized the data ranging 504 from -3.5° to +3.5° from the screen center. For Experiment 3, we visualized the data ranging 505 from -5° to +5° from the center. These ranges were chosen so that each steps along the black 506 curves in Figure 3B and Supplementary Figure 6B contained at least 5 trials per subject on 507 average. To visualize the model fit, we sampled a series of target dot locations along the 508 horizontal axis (in a step of 0.1°), and we used the best-fitting parameters to compute the 509 confidence rating predicted by the models for each target location. We then used the same 510 procedure (a sliding window) to compute the mean confidence rating predicted by the models 511 (the blue curves in Figure 3B and Supplementary Figure 6B) . 512
For Experiment 2, the "psychometric curve" became a heat map in a two-dimensional 513 space ( Figure 5) . We tiled the two-dimensional space with non-overlapped hexagonal spatial 514 windows (with a radius of 0.25°) positioned from -3° to +3° ( Figure 5A ) along both 515 horizontal and vertical axis. To compute the mean confidence rating for each hexagonal 516 window, we averaged the confidence ratings across all the trials fell within that window for 517 each participant. If the number of trials was zero among all the participants for a window, that 518 window was left as white in Figure 5A . To visualize the model fit, we used the best-fitting 519 parameters and computed the confidence rating predicted by the models for an array of target 520 locations (a grid tiling the two-dimensional space with a step of 0.1° along both horizontal 521 and vertical axis). The predicted confidence rating was then averaged within each hexagonal 522 window. 523 
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